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Abstract
A Tap-Based Back-of-Device Mobile Users Authentication System
by
Satvik Kulshreshtha
Master of Science
in
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
University of California, Merced
We propose a novel tap-based mobile user authentication system that enables users to authenticate
themselves by performing tap patterns on the back of the device. With this approach, the user first
selects a pattern as her password, then performs it to authenticate herself. On each authentication
attempt, the system compares the data from the built-in microphone and accelerometer with the
password, then authenticates the user when they are similar. Since the proposed approach requires
performing the tap patterns on the back of the device, it increases security by reducing the risks of
shoulder surfing, smudge, and video attack. In a user study, the approach yielded 70% accuracy
rate with just three samples, and was secure (17% successful attack rate) even in an ideal shoulder
surfing threat model. Further, most participants found it easy-to-use, felt secure while using it, and
wanted to keep using it on their devices.
viii
Chapter 1
Introduction
The usable security community has focused much on investigating different user-centered attack on
mobile devvices, particularly shoulder surfing [1–3], smudge attack [4, 5], and thermal attack [6].
Among these, shoulder surfing is arguably the most discussed threat, in which attackers attempt
to obtain a user’s personal identification numbers (PINs) and other confidential details by looking
over her shoulder [1]. In recent years, different approaches have been applied to alleviate shoulder
surfing attack, which include adding random cues [7–10], using micro gestures [11], enabling force
input [12], forcing the attacker to observe multiple cues [2, 3], and masking user input [13, 14]. In
addition to user authentication, many have explored approaches that aim at protecting mobile users
from shoulder surfing text messages [15] and personal pictures [10]. Most of these works address
a threat model where the attacker can clearly observe the process of password entry once. Other
threat models include multiple observation attack [3, 16–18] and video attack [2, 19].
Many have also investigated smudge attack, in which the attacker studies the oily residues
left on the touchscreen to discover a password [20]. Studies showed that this attack performs well
for patterns since the residue left on the screen offers hints on where the pattern started and ended.
Likewise, smudges offer hints on which digits were used to unlock a device [12]. The methods used
to mitigate smudge attack include graphically transforming the visual cue on which the password is
entered [4, 5], introducing a random element that leads to different smudges at every authentication
attempt [5], and using multiple fingers to increase the complexity of the gesture patterns [21]. The
smudge attack threat model considers clearly visible smudge traces and an optimal lighting condi-
tion to study the smudges on the screen [12]. Besides, the model assures that the attacker has access
to the mobile device.
Thermal image attack, in contrast, exploits the properties of thermal imaging. More specif-
ically, heat traces are transmitted from the user’s fingers to the touchscreen during authentication.
These traces fade away slowly [22], allowing thermal cameras to perceive which parts of the display
have been touched even after the user had already entered the password. Similar to shoulder surfing,
thermal attack leaks information about the order in which password and patterns are entered [20].
Unlike shoulder surfing, thermal attack can be performed after the user had left the device, which
gives the attacker an advantage as she does not have to observe the user performing the authentica-
tion process. This makes this attack subtler. Mowery et al. [23] studied the effectiveness of thermal
attack on ATMs with plastic keypads. They found out that thermal attack are possible even after the
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user is authenticated. Some have explored the effectiveness of thermal attack on mobile and other
touchscreen-based devices. In one such study, Andriotis et al. [6] were able to observe heat traces
resulting from entering a gesture pattern for three seconds after authentication, which enabled them
to retrieve parts of the pattern.
To minimize the risks of the above threats by increasing the security of user authentication,
we introduce a new approach to authenticate mobile users that, inspired by the concept of “secret
knocks”, uses back-of-device tap patterns as passwords and can be used not only for user authenti-
cation but also in other applications, such as to secure peer-to-peer data transfer.
1.1 Objective & Overview
This work aimed at developing a fully automated system that can measure similarity scores between
two tap patterns (namely the sample and an authentication attempt) and authenticate users when the
scores are above predetermined thresholds. The primary objective of this work are as follows.
• Identify the best built-in sensors of a stock smartphone that can detect and classify back-of-
device taps.
• Identify the best similarity score thresholds that can reliability compare two tap patterns using
real-time sensor data in real-word scenarios.
• Design and develop a user authentication approach that can authenticate users by comparing
two back-of-device tap patterns.
• Evaluate the proposed mobile user authentication approach in terms of usability and security
in an empirical study.
The proposed user authentication system is a proof of concept implementation that consists of
a Web application developed for an Android smartphone with HTML5, CSS and JavaScript. It uses
Python scripts to compute data, and Flask framework to establish connections between the applica-
tion and a server, as well as to gather data from the built-in sensors of an off-the-shelf smartphone.
The goal was to enable mobile users to authenticate themselves taking the security of user-data into
account. Although the proposed system focuses on back-of-device taps for user authentication, it
can be integrated into other application, such as to the camera for taking pictures, for sharing data
between devices, and to control a music player.
1.2 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the existing literature on mobile user au-
thentication and the challenges that remain in the field. Chapter 3 describes the architecture of the
proposed back-of-device tap-based user authentication approach. Chapter 4 presents the results of
a pilot and two user studies that evaluated the reliability of built-in sensors in various settings, de-
termine the best thresholds to compare tap patterns, and the usability and security of the proposed
approach. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this thesis with speculation on future extension of this work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter presents a comprehensive review of the existing user authentication approaches from
the literature. Nowadays, mobile devices are developed to serve various functions, as well as to store
sensitive information. The core objective of user authentication is to protect these information from
unauthorized users. For this, researchers have proposed a variety of approaches. Over the past few
years, there has been rich literature, investigating the use of secrete-knowledge based approaches
for user authentication. The subsequent sections provide an overview of these approaches.
Nanavati et al. [24] classified mobile devices authentication in three fundamental approaches:
i) secret-knowledge based, ii) token based, and iii) biometrics. The first uses a secret PIN or pass-
word to authenticate users. While it provides a standard level of protection along with cheap and
quick authentication, this approach alone is inadequate to protect the data stored in mobile devices
since users tend to use common PINs and passwords, and seldom share these with friends and fam-
ily [25]. Besides, most users find this approach very inconvenient and do not have confidence in the
protection it provides [26]. The second is a SIM (Subscriber Identification Module) based approach
that requires the user to remove the device’s SIM when its not being used. However, removing SIM
is not only inconvenient but also not recommended by most service providers. The final approach
is biometrics that relies on a unique feature of the user, that is, it identifies and verifies users based
on human characteristics. There are two different types of biometrics: i) physiological, which in-
cludes fingerprint, facial recognition, and iris scanning, and ii) behavioral, which includes keystroke
dynamics, mouse movements, and speech recognition.
In the earliest era of mobile phones, behavioral authentication focused on keystroke dynamics
that authenticated users based on their typing actions on mobile keypads. Clarke et al. [27] devel-
oped a keystroke dynamics based authentication scheme that relied on the features of key hold-time
and inter-key latency of a keypad. They reported an average equal error rate of 12.8% using a neu-
ral network classifier. Zahid et al. [28] designed a scheme with six keystroke features, including
key hold-time, digraph time, and error rate to authenticate mobile phone users. They demonstrated
that through combining a PIN based verification mechanism, their system could achieve an average
error rate of 2% using a combined classifier of particle swarm optimizer, genetic algorithms, and
a fuzzy classifier. A particle swarm optimizer is a simple algorithm effective for optimizing wide
range of functions [29]. Zahid et al. used it with the recommended modifications [30, 31]. It starts
by assigning particles initial velocities after creating the initial particles. Then the lowest function
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value and best location value are determined after objective function at each particle location is cal-
culated. The new velocity is chosen based on the individual particle’s best location, its neighbor’s
best location, and its current velocity. Then the particle’s location, its velocities, and the neighbor’s
velocities are updated interactively. This iteration continues until a stopping criterion is reached by
the algorithm.
Touch dynamics has received much attention with the advent of touchscreen based phones.
Generally, touch dynamics can provide more behavioral events like touch movement and multitouch
actions than keystroke dynamics that only employs buttons as input method. However, there are
some similarities between touch and keystroke dynamics as single touch events like touch press-up
and press-down are similar to button-up and button-down events. For user authentication, keystroke
and touch gestures can be combined for virtual keyboards or keypads. Zheng et al. [32] presented
an authentication scheme that combined touch and tap features to validate a user when she enters
her password. To build a normal profile for users, they further used a one-class algorithm based on
nearest neighbor distance. They invited 80 participants for the evaluation and reported an average
equal error rate of 3.65%. De Luca et al. [33] attempted to improve the performance of inputting
password patterns against shoulder surfing attack by using touch gestures. Buriro et al. [34] in-
triduced Touchstroke, a bi-modal biometrics authentication scheme that took both the user’s hand
movements and touch typing into account. They mainly focused on a scenario where the user enters
a text-independent 4-digit password.
Feng et al. [35] designed a touchscreen based authentication scheme that required users to
wear a digital glove to verify themselves based on finger gestures. Using a random forest classifier,
they reported a false acceptance rate of 4.66% and a false rejection rate of 0.13%. Meng et al. [36]
developed a behavioral authentication scheme for smartphones that utilized 21 touch features. They
reported an average error rate of 3% by using a neural network classifier. Frank et al. [37] proposed
a touch behavioral authentication scheme that used a total of 30 touch features. In an evaluation, it
yielded a median equal error rate of 4%. However, the authors cautioned that this approach could
only be deployed as an optional, not standalone, authentication scheme. Sae-Bae et al. [38] focused
on multi-touch behavior and proposed to authenticate users based on up to 22 multi-touch gestures
that can be extracted from both hand and finger actions.
Some recent works have combined behavioral and other biometrics for added security. Smith-
Creasey and Rajarajan [39] developed an authentication scheme by combining face and touch ges-
tures. They reported an equal error rate of 3.77% using a stacked classifier approach. Shahzad
et al. [40] proposed a scheme that utilized how users interact with touchscreens when performing
a touch gesture and a signature. It accounted for touch velocity, device acceleration, and stroke
time. Nguyen et al. [41] proposed a method that required users to draw a PIN on a touchscreen
instead of typing. It used a PIN content analyzer and a drawing behavior analyzer to identify im-
posters. Arif et al. [12] proposed a different scheme that added pseudo pressure detection to the
digit-lock method for an extra layer of security. With this approach, both the PIN and the force
applied to enter the digits became the user’s password. Another approach augmented up, down,
left, and right gestures to the digit keys to enable the user to either tap or perform any one of the
four gestures when selecting their PINs [11]. An evaluation showed that users felt secure when
using this approach although it was error prone and slower than the conventional digit lock method.
Meng et al. [42], on the other hand, combined a touch movement based authentication scheme with
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the common pattern-lock method. A study suggested that this approach can increase security with-
out degrading usability. Arif and Mazalek [43] proposed two new user authentication techniques.
The first enabled user to select custom slide patterns as their passwords. It divided the screen into
three different zones, where each zone acted as a distinct touch area. The second, a variation of the
first method, also allowed users to pick one of the three available time-frames for each zone. Both
methods performed relatively well in an evaluation, and users found the first method easy to use.
Some additional mechanisms can be used to enhance the performance of behavioral authenti-
cation. Meng et al. [44] identified that classifier performance can be unstable due to specific training
data. They proposed an adaptive mechanism that can maintain the authentication accuracy. They
then described a lightweight touch gesture based scheme, which yielded an average error rate of
2.46%. With the increasing capability of smartphones, behavioral authentication has also received
some attention. A recent survey [45] on biometric authentication provides further details.
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Chapter 3
Proposed System
We developed a tap-based user authentication approach that uses the concept of “secret knock”,
which was used during the prohibition era (1920-1933), on the back of the device to authenticate
the user. It uses the built-in microphone and accelerometer of a stock smartphone to detect back-of-
device taps. It was implemented taking the security aspect of user authentication into account.
We argue that the proposed approach is more secure compared to the existing authentication
systems since the taps are performed on the back of the device, which reduces the risk of shoulder
surfing. When under video surveillance, back-of-device taps also reduces the risk of getting the
password caught or recorded on camera. Using this mechanism, users do not have to remember a
password or a PIN, which is arguably more difficult than remembering a tap pattern. The proposed
approach is also more secure than the pattern-lock authentication method since it does not leave any
smudges on the touchscreen, which makes it relatively easy to guess a touch pattern.
The proposed approach can be used on various devices, including smartwatches, smart-
phones, and tablets. But as a proof of concept implementation, we used an off-the-shelf Android
smartphone. To make the prototype user-friendly, we develop a Web application that uses HTML5,
CSS and JavaScript [46] on front-end and Python on back-end to handle server side operations.
It also uses Flask, a micro framework for Python for establishing connections between the appli-
cation and the application server. Since the implementation is in development environment, it is
tested over localhost. Mozilla Firefox browser is used as a client to run the Web application since
other browsers do not allow the sensors to be monitored when an application is in the development
environment. Rest APIs are used to connect application to the Data Access Objects since no real
database is used in the implementation.
3.0.1 System Overview
Primarily, the proposed system involves performing patterns generated by taps on the back of the
device that are recorded using the built-in microphone and accelerometer. A smartphone is con-
sidered for the development of this system as motion and orientation sensor are easily available on
these devices as compared to older devices. The patterns generated were recorded in two forms: a
wave audio file and acceleration (the rate of change in velocity) recorded by the microphone and the
accelerometer, respectively. The data are then processed in two parts.
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Figure 3.1: High-level system overview.
The first part includes Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithm and Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT), which are used for the wave audio file to match the audio pattern. DTW [47] processes simi-
larity between two temporal sequences in time domain. The input signals (wave audio files) are read
and the features are extracted using LibROSA, a package written in Python programming language
for music and audio analysis. Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCCs) are a feature widely
used in automatic speech and speaker recognition. After feature extraction, the minimum distance
between two time-domain sequences is estimated, which helps in finding if the observed input is
similar to the estimated input. Distance of zero implies a perfect match and gives a straight line.
To analyze the frequency domain of the recorded data, Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [47] is used.
FFT reveals periodicity in input data and the relative strength of periodic component. FFT splits the
input data into smaller components, hence makes finding similarity patterns in frequency domain
more convenient. Mean Square Error (MSE) is calculated on FFT to find out the accuracy between
two given input data, which are wave audio files. A MSE of zero implies estimated and observed
values are matched with perfect accuracy.
An accelerometer sensor in a smartphone is an electro-mechanical device used to measure
acceleration forces, the measurement of the rate of change in velocity that may be the force of
gravity or vibrations. Smartphones and other mobile devices recognize their orientation through the
use of an accelerator, which is a small device made up of axis-based motion sensing. Generally,
accelerometers are made up of multiple axes. Most smartphones make use of three-axis models
to determine the moment of impact. Therefore, second part of the implementation includes sharp
peaks detection by calculating the relative maxima of the noisy data recorded by accelerometer.
3.0.2 System Architecture
The architecture of the proposed system is described as follows. It records microphone and ac-
celerometer data generated by back-of-device taps, then applies two methods to authenticate users.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the method implemented for matching the wave audio file recorded
using the built-in microphone of the device. After the data is recorded using the Web application
on the front-end, the data is sent to the local server developed with Flask. Pattern matching method
is implemented on this application server, which uses two algorithms to perform pattern matching.
The two main modules of this method are the DTW and the FFT. The steps involved in DTW are:
distance calculation between each pair of frames in the sample frequency. Aligning the frequency
samples and finding the minimum distance between the samples. FFT includes blocking of the
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Figure 3.2: Architecture of the proposed system.
signal into N number of frames (this method is called frame blocking) followed by computing the
frequency spectrum. Finally, the Mean Square Error is calculated.
Figure 3.3: Processing of the audio data.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the method implemented for matching the peaks recorded using the
accelerometer sensor. The algorithm for finding peak includes performing the continuous wavelets
transform on the data followed by finding the maxima at each row in the matrix and filtering the
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height and width. The parameters used to calculate the relative maxima of the given data are: the
array in which the relative maxima has to be calculated, the axis of data, order that shows what
points are needed for comparison, and the mode that determines how the edges of the vector are
treated (sharp or soft). The tuple of integer array of maxima is returned at the end.
Figure 3.4: Processing of accelerometer data
The results from the two methods are combined together to match the patterns generated by
the user by performing the back-of-device taps to determine whether the user is authenticated with
the system or not. Both methods are applied on each input pattern generated by the user. Every
pattern is compared with each other to find the similarity score in order to authenticate the user. The
effectiveness of proposed framework is evaluated in terms of success rate and attack failure rate.
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Chapter 4
Evaluation
We conducted a pilot and two user studies to evaluate the reliability of built-in sensors in various
settings, determine the best thresholds to compare tap patterns, and the usability and security of the
proposed approach.
4.1 Pilot Study
This pilot study was conducted to find out whether the system recognizes the taps on back-of-device
and to find out which sensors are the most suitable for detecting these taps.
4.1.1 Apparatus
The device used for the study was Motorola G5 Plus smartphone (150.2 × 74 × 7.7 mm), which
weighs 155g, running Android OS version 7.0 (Nougat) at 1080 × 1920 pixels.
4.1.2 Design
We used a within-subjects design. The independent variables were sensor (Accelerometer, Gyro-
scope, and the Microphone) and setting. There were two settings in the study to record readings
from microphone sensor and accelerometer/gyroscope sensor.For microphone sensor readings, four
settings were considered: 1) indoor with no background noise, 2) indoor with background noise
(noise such as, television sound and chatting), 3) outdoor, and 4) outdoor with heavy background
noise (such as noise from a construction site). For Accelerometer and Gyroscope, two settings were
considered: tap on back-of-device while 1) seated and 2) walking.
4.1.3 Participants
For this study, we recruited five male participants from the local university. Their age ranged from
22 to 29 years. They were not compensated for volunteering.
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4.1.4 Procedure
In the study, participants were instructed to tap on back-of-device in the given conditions. The
device was held in upright position during the study for every condition. The participants were
asked to tap for ten times on the back of the device with a uniform interval of one second in all
the conditions which makes a total of 300 patterns. The data were then sent to server for further
computation.
Figure 4.1: Data recorded by Microphone.
Figure 4.2: Data recorded by Gyroscope.
4.1.5 Observations
We made the following observations.
1. Data showed that the proposed system is able to detect the taps on the back-of-device.
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Figure 4.3: Data recorded by Accelerometer.
2. After comparing the data recorded by the three sensors, we conclude that the microphone and
the accelerometer are the most reliable sensors to detect the taps on the back-of-device (see
Figure 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3.
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4.2 User Study 1
In order to develop the proposed real-time user authentication system, we need data in real scenarios
to set appropriate threshold for all users so that we get high true positive rate and low false positive
rate. The purpose of this study was to find out a threshold for the development of the system to
authenticate the user with the device.
4.2.1 Apparatus
The device used for the study was Motorola G5 Plus smartphone (150.2 × 74 × 7.7 mm), which
weighs 155g, running Android OS version 7.0 (Nougat) at 1080 × 1920 pixels and has 60 to 120
frames per inch (fpi).
We used a Web application for this study that is developed using HTML5, JavaScript, and
Python. The WebkitAudio API was used in this application. For frequency matching Fast Fourier
Transform (FFT) and Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithms were used. For establishing con-
nection between client server, Flask , a microframework was used. The application launched with
a plain full-screen view, which user touches in order to trigger the recording, and touches again to
stop recording. Wave File Audio (.wav) file format used for collected knocks or pattern.
4.2.2 Design and Participants
We used a within-subjects design for this usability testing study. Fifteen participants volunteered to
take part in this study. All the participants were recruited from local university community. Their
average age was 26.2 years (SD = 3.05). Five of them were female and ten were male. All of them
were frequent smartphone users, with on average 6.34 years (SD = 2.29) of experience with touch-
screen devices. Fourteen of them were right-handed, one was ambidextrous. The ambidextrous user
used the right hand to perform back-of-the-device tapping.
4.2.3 Procedure
First, the study procedure was explained to all participants. The study was conducted under regular
environment considering there was a lot of background noise. The Web application developed
for recording the tapping data was launched on the smartphone and was given to the participants.
Participant were instructed to hold the device in any preferred orientation (e.g., portrait or landscape)
and were allowed to use any hand for holding the device and tapping. Then were asked to tap a
pattern or a rhythm of their choice on the back-of-device.
To start the study, participants touched the screen of device to trigger the sensor recording,
and once they finish, they tapped the screen again to stop the sensor from recording data. They were
allowed to re-select their pattern if they are not satisfied with their initial pattern choice. Manual
record were kept of how the device was held by the participants to perform tapping during the study.
They were asked to perform the experiment five times after recording the initial pattern (total six
times) keeping the same pattern or rhythm they tapped at the first time.
There were mandatory breaks between every round of tapping to make sure participants did
not feel fatigue and to observe if they remember the pattern correctly. Finally, all participants were
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Figure 4.4: Two participants taking part in the study. Participant on the left is interacting to the
application and performing back-of-device tapping. Participant performing back-of-device tapping,
on the right.
asked to complete a short questionnaire.
4.2.4 Results
We calculated the standard deviation to detect outliers. Based on observed values, we excluded
one participant because the value recorded were above ±3 standard deviation (SD). Therefore, total
number of users became fifteen.
4.2.4.1 Maximum and Minimum Intensity of Peaks
The average maximum intensity of peaks was 6871.90 dB and the standard deviation recorded was
8131.16. The average minimum intensity and standard deviation of peaks was -7411.14dB and
9265.41, respectively. See Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: Average Maximum and Minimum intensity of peaks recorded per user.
4.2.4.2 Duration of Peaks
The average duration of peaks was 4.96 Seconds and the standard deviation recorded was 2.53. See
Figure 4.11.
4.2.4.3 Number of Peaks
The average number of peaks recorded during the study was 6.93 and the standard deviation recorded
was 4.81. See Figure 4.7.
15
Figure 4.6: Total Duration of peaks per User.
4.2.4.4 DTW and FFT Scores
Mean and Standard deviation of the scores computed using DTW are 111.25 and 28.59 respectively.
For FFT, the mean of the scores is 826.125 and its corresponding standard deviation is 1732.39.
4.2.4.5 Questionnaire
Upon completion of the study, all participants completed a short questionnaire. Four out of fifteen
participants said that the pattern they tapped was music inspired. Five out of fifteen participants
said that the pattern was their random choice that came to their mind and was easy to tap, remaining
participants said they have a pattern that they are familiar with since childhood, hence chose that
pattern.
All the participants agreed that the pattern they performed was easy to remember, caused no
mental fatigue. Two out of fifteen participants felt that tapping on back-of-device caused physi-
cal fatigue. Thirteen out of fifteen participants said they will prefer using the back-of-device user
authentication method in future, while two said they will prefer some other method of user authen-
tication.
4.2.5 Discussion
In this study, we gathered data from fifteen participants who performed back-of-device tapping.
After complete analysis of data collected, results shows that it is difficult to set a common threshold
for every user as the intensity of taps may vary with the user. Results also revealed that user will
prefer tap-based user authentication method in future. A couple of the participants also felt that this
method of authentication is safer than existing method, such as PIN and Password, since it saves
them from shoulder surfing.
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Figure 4.7: Average number of peaks recorded.
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4.3 User Study 2
The purpose of this study was to get real-time data from the users and to test the user authentication
system in real scenario and to evaluate the system such that we get high true positive rate and low
false positive rate.
4.3.1 Apparatus
The device used for the study was Motorola G5 Plus smartphone (150.2 × 74 × 7.7 mm), which
weighs 155g, running Android OS version 7.0 (Nougat) at 1080 × 1920 pixels and has 60 to 120
frames per inch (fpi).
We used a Web application for this study that is developed using HTML5, JavaScript and
Python. WebkitAudio API was used in this application for recording the microphone data. For
frequency matching Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) algorithms
were used. For establishing connection between client server, Flask, a micro framework was used.
To detect and match the peaks formed in rate of change of velocity, sciPy-signal python module was
used.
The application launched with a plain full-screen view, which users touched in order to trigger
the recording of their patterns/rhythms, and touched again to stop recording. Wave File Audio (.wav)
file format and an integer array of acceleration data (rate of change of velocity) were recorded and
analyzed in order to match the pattern recorded by user.
4.3.2 Design and Participants
We used a within-subjects design for this study. Twelve participants volunteered to take part in this
study. All the participants were recruited from local university community. Their average age was
26.16 years. Three of them were female and nine were male. All of them were frequent smartphone
users, with on average 7.5 years of experience with touchscreen devices. Eleven of them were
right-handed, one was ambidextrous. The ambidextrous user used the right hand to perform back-
of-device tapping.
User Attacker
12 participants × 12 participants ×
3 tap rhythms × 3 tap rhythms ×
5 attempts= 180 attempts 5 attacks= 180 attacks
4.3.3 Procedure
First, the study procedure was explained to all participants. The study was done under regular envi-
ronment considering there was a background noise. The Web application developed for recording
the tapping data was launched on the smartphone and was given to the participants.
The study was done in pairs where one participant was user and other one was attacker. First,
the user was asked to record three patterns of his/her choice on the back-of-device and was asked to
repeat it for five times making it a total of fifteen patterns from one user. Meanwhile, the attacker
was asked to observe the pattern tapped by user over the shoulders. Secondly,the attacker was asked
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Figure 4.8: Two participants performing the study. Participant on the left is interacting to the
application and performing back-of-device tapping. Participant performing back-of-device tapping,
on the right.
to replicate the pattern in ten attempts recorded by user in order to determine the success rate of the
authentication system and to check whether the system resist shoulder surfing attack.
Then the participants switch their roles and repeated the study. They were given three at-
tempts to record the training data and the final attempt was the test data that authenticate their
pattern. To start the study, participants touched the screen of device to trigger the sensor recording,
and once they finish, they tap the screen again to stop the sensor from recording data.
4.3.4 Results
All the participants held the device in portrait position with right hand and perform the tapping
using index finger of the same hand.One participant used middle finger to perform some taps. It was
observed that eleven out of twelve participants (N = 11) tapped on the center of the back of device
while one participant performed at top right corner of the back of device. The average number of
taps recorded during the study was 4.055 and the standard deviation recorded was 1.41 (Figure 4.9).
The average maximum intensity of peaks was 10532.96 dB and the standard deviation recorded
was 3913.64 (Figure 4.10). The average minimum intensity and standard deviation of peaks was
-9749.26dB and 3666.73 respectively. The average duration of peaks was 2.70 Seconds and the
standard deviation recorded was 0.62.(Figure 4.11).Eleven out of fifteen (SD = 1.75) successful
attempts were recorded on an average. (Figure 4.12) and only 2.5 attacks out of fifteen on average
were recorded successful attempts to crack the password.(Figure 4.13).
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Figure 4.9: Average number of taps recorded per user.
Figure 4.10: Average maximum and minimum intensity of peaks recorded per user.
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Figure 4.11: Total duration of peaks per user.
Figure 4.12: Successful attempts per user
21
Figure 4.13: Number of times pattern hacked per user
4.3.5 Questionnaire
Upon completion of the study, all participants went through an informal interview session. Most
participants(N = 7) selected the pattern as their favorite song or tunes. Rest of the participants (N =
5) selected the rhythm that are easy to remember. Results showed that mops of the participants (N
= 11) found that the taps were easy to remember and remaining one participant found it difficult.
Most participants felt that performing the back-of-device rhythms did not cause any cognitive (N
= 11) or physical ( N = 10) stress, however a few participant felt slightly cognitive (n = 1) and
physical (N = 2) stress for extensive use.
Eight out of fifteen participants wanted to use the back-of-device authentication method in future.
Remaining three out of four participants liked the idea of back of the device tapping authentication
but did not want to use the method in future due to technological issues such as high false negative
rate. And one participant was undecided about it.
As a shoulder surfer, eleven out of twelve (N =11) participants responded that it was difficult to
observe the tapping pattern. Many participants mentioned that they were able to crack some pass-
word because the setting provided to them to shoulder surf was ideal (quiet room and unobstructed
view of the authentication process), but they also mentioned that it would be difficult to observe and
crack the authentication pattern in real world.
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User Pattern hacked Pattern not hacked
1 1 14
2 1 14
3 0 15
4 3 12
5 3 12
6 2 13
7 6 9
8 1 14
9 2 13
10 7 8
11 2 13
12 2 13
Table 4.1: Table showing successful attempts and failed attempts by attacker to hack the pattern
created by the user.
4.3.6 Summary
In this study, we gathered data from twelve participants who performed back-of-device tapping.
Eight out of fifteen participant felt that the proposed system is convenient and secure to use as it
does not leave smudge on the screen and resist shoulder surfing. Results also revealed that user
would prefer tap-based user authentication method in future. Study showed that when attacker tried
to break the authentication pattern created by user, attacker failed on an average of 12.5 times out of
fifteen attempts and succeeded to bypass the authentication on an average of 2.5 times out of fifteen
attempts given (see Table 4.1 and 4.2).
User Successful Failed TPR FPR
1 12 3 0.80 0.20
2 12 3 0.80 0.2
3 12 3 0.80 0.2
4 13 2 0.86 0.13
5 9 6 0.60 0.40
6 7 8 0.46 0.53
7 9 6 0.60 0.40
8 9 6 0.60 0.40
9 10 1 0.66 0.33
10 11 4 0.73 0.26
11 9 6 0.60 0.40
12 12 3 0.86 0.20
Table 4.2: Table showing successful attempts and failed attempts by user to match the pattern.
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The Effectiveness of the proposed system is evaluated in terms of True positive rate (TPR)
and False positive rate (FPR), which is shown in the Receiver Operating Curve below (Figure 4.14).
TPR and FPR are calculated using the following equations.
TPR =
Authenticated User
Authenticated User + Invalid User
FPR =
InvalidUser
Invalid User + Authenticated User
Figure 4.14: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve.
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4.3.7 Limitations
The proposed user authentication system is developed using a smartphone device since older models
of the mobile devices might not have the sensors like accelerometer and gyroscope. So, we can
say that the system only works with a smartphone that has the motion and the orientation sensors
available in the device.
Since the user authentication system uses a pattern or a rhythm, it highly relies on the memory
of the user. Pilot study showed that some users forgot their rhythm and changed the authentication
pattern after first attempt. So, we can say that it follows the same memorability characteristics as
similar techniques such as PIN, Password and lock pattern based authentication.
The proposed system might fail to detect the taps in loud noisy environment as the micro-
phone will detect more noise than actual authentication pattern. Accelerometer might fail to recog-
nize the pattern if the user waives his hand or the device while tapping on the back of the device as
there will be a severe change in the rate of change of velocity and peaks will not form properly.
This user authentication technique requires one handed interaction with the device but many
users used two hand to do the interaction. However, it is seen that user tends to use two hands with
the other user authentication technique too.
After a study, it can be seen that the patterns that are either created using multiple fingers
or the patterns that are too long have less chances of getting recognized by the tap based mobile
authentication system.
Finally, there are different cases and covers available in market for the safety of devices that
may alter the pattern that user actually want to create and the system might fail to recognize the
pattern.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this work, we proposed a tap-based user authentication system using the concept of back-of-
device taping. In order to get authenticated with the device, user taps a pattern or a rhythm on the
back-of-device and the system records the user’s pattern. The system uses in-built device sensors,
such as the microphone and the accelerometer, to detect the back-of-device tapping. The proposed
system is more secure than the existing methods of user authentication since the back-of-device
tapping makes the system secure against attacks such as shoulder surfing and camera attacks.
The main contributions of this work are: (1) the proof-of-concept implementation of back-of-
device tap detection using in-built sensor available in a mobile device (such as, a smartphone) and
(2) user study that illustrates the performance of the proposed system in real-time.
We conducted a pilot study to test if the system is able to detect back-of-device tapping
without any external hardware and using the in-built sensors available in the smartphones. Another
user study was conducted with fifteen participants who volunteered to take part in this study. All
the participants were recruited from local university community. The purpose of this study was to
set an appropriate threshold in order to authenticate users with the device, which is used to further
improve the system. The results of this study showed that it is difficult to set a common threshold for
individual user since the tapping intensity varies with every user. So, instead of setting a common
threshold we decided to take multiple samples of input pattern to determine different threshold for
each user.
The results from the final study showed that the proposed system performed well in the given
scenario. The results from the study also showed that when tried to break the authentication pattern
created by user, attacker failed on an average of 12.5 times and succeeded to bypass the authenti-
cation on an average of 2.5 times out of fifteen attempts given, regardless of the fact that they were
given a clear view of the password entry. Yet, more work is needed to make the system more se-
cure. An informal interview conducted with the participants acting as attacker after the final study
showed that the system performed well against shoulder surfing attack as it is difficult to recognize
the pattern when tapping performed was on the back-of-the-device.
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Chapter 6
Future Scope
There are things that needs to be investigated and explored. In the future scope of this approach,
the implementation of the system can be done using different machine learning models, which may
help increase the accuracy of this system as the model will train every time there is a new pattern
and will try to produce accurate output.
Further research is needed to determine which algorithm works best for pattern matching to
reduce the response time of the system. Some solution may suggest to develop native operating
systems applications such as Android application or iOS applications rather than using a web based
application. This proof of concept implementation can be integrated with other application to en-
hance the functionality of application, for example, It can be integrated with the camera to take
picture just by tapping at the back-of-device. Another application could be sharing the data with
another device over Bluetooth using back-of-device tapping, which will also make the data sharing
more secure.
Finally, to achieve the better accuracy, more studies can be conducted in real-world scenarios
with a larger sample to get more reliable data.
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Appendix A
Web application And Application Server
Recording sensor data and creating JSON
i f ( window . D e v i c e O r i e n t a t i o n E v e n t && boo l == t r u e )
{
window . a d d E v e n t L i s t e n e r ( ” d e v i c e o r i e n t a t i o n ” , p r o c e s s G y r o ) ;
}
e l s e
{
a l e r t ( ” D e v i c e O r i e n t a t i o n i s n o t s u p p o r t e d ” ) ;
}
i f ( window . DeviceMot ionEven t && boo l == t r u e )
{
window . a d d E v e n t L i s t e n e r ( ” d e v i c e m o t i o n ” , mot ion ) ;
}
e l s e
{
a l e r t ( ” DeviceMot ionEven t i s n o t s u p p o r t e d ” ) ;
}
c o n s o l e . c l e a r ( ) ;
}
f u n c t i o n p r o c e s s G y r o ( e v e n t )
{
i f ( boo l == t r u e ) {
xG =document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” a l p h a ” ) . innerHTML=e v e n t . a l p h a ;
yG =document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” b e t a ” ) . innerHTML=e v e n t . b e t a ;
zG =document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” gamma ” ) . innerHTML =e v e n t . gamma ;
a r r x G . push ( xG ) ;
a r r y G . push ( yG ) ;
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a r r z G . push ( zG ) ;
}
}
f u n c t i o n mot ion ( e v e n t )
{
i f ( boo l == t r u e ) {
xAcc = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ”X” ) . innerHTML=e v e n t .
a c c e l e r a t i o n I n c l u d i n g G r a v i t y . x ;
yAcc = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ”Y” ) . innerHTML=e v e n t .
a c c e l e r a t i o n I n c l u d i n g G r a v i t y . y ;
zAcc = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” Z ” ) . innerHTML =e v e n t .
a c c e l e r a t i o n I n c l u d i n g G r a v i t y . z ;
a r r x A c c . push ( xAcc ) ;
a r r y A c c . push ( yAcc ) ;
a r r z A c c . push ( zAcc ) ;
}
Getting accelerometer data
@app . r o u t e ( ’ / s e n s o r d a t a ’ , methods =[ ’POST ’ ] )
d e f add message1 ( ) :
c o n t e n t = r e q u e s t . j s o n
xAcc = l i s t ( c o n t e n t [ ’ xAcc ’ ] . v a l u e s ( ) )
xAcc1 = xAcc [ 1 : ]
yAcc = l i s t ( c o n t e n t [ ’ yAcc ’ ] . v a l u e s ( ) )
yAcc1 = yAcc [ 1 : ]
zAcc = l i s t ( c o n t e n t [ ’ zAcc ’ ] . v a l u e s ( ) )
zAcc1 = zAcc [ 1 : ]
l b l = c o n t e n t [ ’ l b l ’ ] [ 1 : ]
t x t f i l e = ” / p a t h / t o / f i l e ”
wi th open ( t x t f i l e , ”w” ) as o u t p u t :
w r i t e r = csv . w r i t e r ( o u t p u t , l i n e t e r m i n a t o r = ’\n ’ )
f o r v a l i n zAcc1 :
i f v a l :
w r i t e r . w r i t e r o w ( [ v a l ] )
t x t f i l e = ” / p a t h / t o / f i l e ”
wi th open ( t x t f i l e , ”w” ) as o u t p u t :
w r i t e r = csv . w r i t e r ( o u t p u t , l i n e t e r m i n a t o r = ’\n ’ )
f o r v a l i n l b l :
i f v a l :
w r i t e r . w r i t e r o w ( [ v a l ] )
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f = open ( ’ / p a t h / t o / f i l e ’ , ’ r + ’ )
d a t a = f . r e a d ( )
f . c l o s e ( )
f o r i i n d a t a :
i f i :
a c c d a t a = d a t a . s p l i t ( )
x = np . a r r a y ( a c c d a t a )
x = np . a s f a r r a y ( x , f l o a t )
n o i s y = a r r a y ( x )
pk ind = a r r a y ( a r g r e l m a x ( no i sy , o r d e r =35) )
n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c = pk ind . s i z e
# p r i n t ( ” Peaks : ” , n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c )
# readzAcc1 ( )
# n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c 1 = readzAcc1 ( )
r e t u r n n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c
r e t u r n ’ s u c c e s s ’
Recording microphone data and sending it to server
A p l u g i n f o r r e c o r d i n g t h e o u t p u t o f Web Audio API nodes
d e v e l o p e d by Matt Diamond and Axew3 i s used i n t h i s work . Th i s
code e x t e n d s t h e work done by− h t t p s : / / g i t h u b . com / mat td iamond
/ R e c o r d e r j s and h t t p s : / / g i t h u b . com / axew3 / monowaw−AudioRecorder
v a r XHR = new XMLHttpRequest ( ) ;
XHR = new XMLHttpRequest ( ) ;
XHR. o n r e a d y s t a t e c h a n g e = f u n c t i o n ( ) {
i f (XHR. r e a d y S t a t e === 0 | | XHR. r e a d y S t a t e === 1) {
/ / c o n s o l e . l o g (XHR. r e s p o n s e ;
} e l s e i f (XHR. r e a d y S t a t e === 3) {
/ / c o n s o l e . l o g (XHR. r e s p o n s e ) ;
} e l s e i f (XHR. r e a d y S t a t e === 4) {
c o n s o l e . l o g (XHR. r e s p o n s e + ’ done ’ ) ;
/ / v a r d i s p = XHR. r e s p o n s e T e x t ;
d i s p = XHR. r e s p o n s e T e x t ;
/ / document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” o u t p u t ” ) . innerHTML = d i s p ;
check ( ) ;
} e l s e {
/ / c o n s o l e . l o g (XHR. r e s p o n s e ) ;
}
}
XHR. open ( ”GET” , ” h t t p : / / l o c a l h o s t : 8 8 9 0 / s e n s o r d a t a ” ) ;
XHR. send ( ) ;
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f u n c t i o n saveAudio ( ) {
a u d i o R e c o r d e r . exportWAV ( doneEncoding ) ;
}
f u n c t i o n g o t B u f f e r s ( b u f f e r s ) {
v a r ca n va s = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” w a v e d i s p l a y ” ) ;
d r a w B u f f e r ( c an va s . width , c an v as . h e i g h t , c an v as . g e t C o n t e x t ( ’ 2 d ’ ) ,
b u f f e r s [ 0 ] ) ;
a u d i o R e c o r d e r . exportWAV ( doneEncoding ) ;
}
R e c o r d e r . se tupDownload ( blob , ” knocks ” + r e c o r d I n d e x + ” . wav” ) ;
f u n c t i o n doneEncoding ( b lob ) {
i f ( r e c o r d I n d e x < 1)
{
R e c o r d e r . se tupDownload ( blob , ” knocks ” + r e c o r d I n d e x + ” . wav” ) ;
r e c o r d I n d e x ++;
}
e l s e
{
R e c o r d e r . se tupDownload ( blob , ” knocks ” + ”1” + ” . wav” ) ;
}
}
f u n c t i o n check ( ) {
i f ( d i s p == ” Match ” ) {
YES ( ) ;
}
e l s e i f ( d i s p == ” Mismatch ” ) {
NO( ) ;
}
}
f u n c t i o n YES ( ) {
v a r x = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” s n a c k b a r ” ) ;
x . c lassName = ” show ” ;
s e t T i m e o u t ( f u n c t i o n ( ) { x . c lassName = x . c lassName . r e p l a c e ( ” show ” ,
” ” ) ; } , 3000) ;
}
f u n c t i o n NO( ) {
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v a r x = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” s n a c k b a r 1 ” ) ;
x . c lassName = ” show ” ;
s e t T i m e o u t ( f u n c t i o n ( ) { x . c lassName = x . c lassName . r e p l a c e ( ” show ” ,
” ” ) ; } , 3000) ;
/ / v a r o u t = ” S t a r t Taps ” ;
/ / v a r xyz = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” o u t p u t ” ) . innerHTML = o u t ;
}
f u n c t i o n myFunct ion ( ) {
/ / v a r x = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” r e c o r d ” ) . name ;
document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” r e c o r d ” ) . innerHTML = t e x t + ”<br >” +
t e x t 0 ;
}
f u n c t i o n myFunct ion1 ( ) {
/ / v a r x = document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” r e c o r d ” ) . name ;
document . ge tE lemen tById ( ” r e c o r d ” ) . innerHTML = t e x t 1 ;
}
f u n c t i o n t o g g l e R e c o r d i n g ( e ) {
i f ( e . c l a s s L i s t . c o n t a i n s ( ” knocks ” ) ) {
i f ( c o u n t = 1)
{
a u d i o R e c o r d e r . s t o p ( ) ;
myFunct ion1 ( ) ;
send ( ) ;
/ / check ( ) ;
e . c l a s s L i s t . remove ( ” knocks ” ) ;
a u d i o R e c o r d e r . g e t B u f f e r s ( g o t B u f f e r s ) ;
c o u n t = 0 ;
}
} e l s e {
/ / s t a r t r e c o r d i n g
i f ( ! a u d i o R e c o r d e r )
r e t u r n ;
e . c l a s s L i s t . add ( ” knocks ” ) ;
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a u d i o R e c o r d e r . c l e a r ( ) ;
myFunct ion ( ) ;
/ / YES ( ) ;
a u d i o R e c o r d e r . r e c o r d ( ) ;
c o u n t = 1 ;
}
}
Returning result to server
@app . r o u t e ( ’ / s e n s o r d a t a ’ , methods =[ ’GET ’ ] )
d e f add message ( ) :
t ime . s l e e p ( 0 . 5 )
n u m f i l e s = l e n ( fnmatch . f i l t e r ( os . l i s t d i r ( ” / p a t h / t o / d i r e c t o r y ” ) ,
’ ∗ . wav ’ ) )
p r i n t ( n u m f i l e s )
i f ( n u m f i l e s == 2) :
rename1 ( ) , rename2 ( ) , rename3 ( ) , rename4 ( )
i f ( n u m f i l e s == 4) :
MSE3 = g e t f f t 3 ( )
minMSE , maxMSE = mseRange ( )
DTW3 = ge td tw3 ( )
minDtw , maxDtw = dtwRange ( )
n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c 1 = readzAcc1 ( )
p r i n t ( ” peak1 : ” , n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c 1 )
n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c = saveToDisk ( )
p r i n t ( ” peak : ” , n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c )
# i f ( ( minDtw <= DTW3 <= maxDtw ) or ( minMSE <= MSE3 <= maxMSE) or
( n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c==n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c 1 ) ) :
i f ( ( n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c==n u m b e r o f p e a k s a c c 1 ) ) :
p r i n t ( ” match ” )
r e t u r n ’ Match ’
e l s e :
p r i n t ( ” mismatch ” )
r e t u r n ’ Mismatch ’
e l s e :
r e t u r n ”\ n ”
Calculating Fast Fourier Transform and Mean Square Error
f s r a t e , s i g n a l = w a v f i l e . r e a d ( ’ / p a t h / t o / f i l e ’ )
p e a k n o r m a l i z e d a u d i o = py ln . n o r m a l i z e . peak ( s i g n a l , −1.0)
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# p r i n t ( ” Frequency s a m p l in g ” , f s r a t e )
l a u d i o = l e n ( s i g n a l . shape )
# p r i n t ( ” Channe l s ” , l a u d i o )
i f l a u d i o == 2 :
s i g n a l = s i g n a l . sum ( a x i s =1) / 2
N = s i g n a l . shape [ 0 ]
# p r i n t ( ” Complete Sampl ings N” , N)
s e c s = N / f l o a t ( f s r a t e )
# p r i n t ( ” s e c s ” , s e c s )
Timestamp = 1 . 0 / f s r a t e
t = s c i p y . a r a n g e ( 0 , s ecs , Timessample )
FFT = ( s c i p y . f f t ( s i g n a l ) )
FFT s ide = FFT [ ( r a n g e (N / / 2 ) ) ] # one s i d e FFT r a n g e
f r e q s = s c i p y . f f t p a c k . f f t f r e q ( s i g n a l . s i z e , t [1] − t [ 0 ] )
f f t f r e q s = np . a r r a y ( f r e q s )
f r e q s s i d e = f r e q s [ r a n g e (N / / 2 ) ] # one s i d e f r e q u e n c y r a n g e
f f t f r e q s s i d e = np . a r r a y ( f r e q s s i d e )
f s r a t e 1 , s i g n a l 1 = w a v f i l e . r e a d ( ’ / p a t h / t o / f i l e ’ )
l a u d i o 1 = l e n ( s i g n a l 1 . shape )
i f l a u d i o 1 == 2 :
s i g n a l 1 = s i g n a l 1 . sum ( a x i s =1) / 2
N1 = s i g n a l 1 . shape [ 0 ]
s e c s 1 = N1 / f l o a t ( f s r a t e 1 )
Timesample1 = 1 . 0 / f s r a t e 1 # s a m p l i n g i n t e r v a l i n t ime
t 1 = s c i p y . a r a n g e ( 0 , secs1 , Timessample1 )
FFT1 = ( s c i p y . f f t ( s i g n a l 1 ) )
FFT s ide1 = FFT1 [ ( r a n g e ( N1 / / 2 ) ) ] # one s i d e FFT r a n g e
f r e q s 1 = s c i p y . f f t p a c k . f f t f r e q ( s i g n a l 1 . s i z e , t 1 [1] − t 1 [ 0 ] )
f f t f r e q s 1 = np . a r r a y ( f r e q s 1 )
f r e q s s i d e 1 = f r e q s 1 [ r a n g e ( N1 / / 2 ) ] # one s i d e f r e q u e n c y r a n g e
f f t f r e q s s i d e 1 = np . a r r a y ( f r e q s s i d e 1 )
X = min (N, N1 )
mse = m e a n s q u a r e d e r r o r ( FFT [ : X] , FFT1 [ : X] )
MSE = i n t ( abs ( mse / 1 0 0 0 0 0 ) )
r e t u r n MSE
Calculating distance between signals using Dynamic Time Warping
y1 , s o u r c e 1 = l i b r o s a . l o a d ( ’ / p a t h / t o / f i l e ’ )
y2 , s o u r c e 2 = l i b r o s a . l o a d ( ’ / p a t h / t o / f i l e ’ )
mfcc1 = l i b r o s a . f e a t u r e . mfcc ( y1 , s o u r c e 1 )
mfcc2 = l i b r o s a . f e a t u r e . mfcc ( y2 , s o u r c e 2 )
# p r i n t ( mfcc1 . shape )
39
d i s t , c o s t , a c c c o s t , p a t h = dtw ( mfcc1 . T , mfcc2 . T , d i s t =lambda x ,
y : norm ( x − y , o rd =1) )
DTW = ( i n t ( d i s t ) )
# p r i n t ( ”DTW: ” , DTW3)
r e t u r n DTW
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